RENAISSANCE OR CAJETANIAN* CORRUPTIONS to the genuine teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas is how the Jesuit theologian Henri de Lubac interpreted the received Thomistic teaching on human nature and divine grace. In fact, it was not Renaissance or Cajetanian corruptions in the received teaching, but the "modern presumptions" in de Lubac's notions of nature that steered him wrong. Even Homer nods, and in this important area de Lubac, a son of Loyola, a faithful son of the Church, a first-class theologian, peritus to the Vatican II, and a Roman Cardinal nodded. And many have nodded following him.
Like many institutions, many beliefs, and many philosophical concepts--like the Cathedral of Notredame where the cult of reason replaced the worship of the divine and a statute of liberty replaced the Virgin Mary--the notion of "human nature" has been a casualty of the Enlightenment. As a result of the prejudices and biases of Enlightenment thinkers, in particular their rejection of Aristotelian teleology and their "deific view of freedom," any theonomic principle in the concept of human nature was excised or amputated. This, of course, had huge effects on the understanding of natural law--which was predicated or built upon the concept of human nature. Tinker with the understanding of human nature and you tinker with natural law. That is why many of the "natural law" theories following the Enlightenment are not natural law theories at all, but cheap imitations or shadows of traditional natural law concepts. This denudation of the concept of human nature is what led Hume into believing that nature's "is" could never yield to nature's "ought." The nature he criticized as unable to yield values, was not the nature of St. Thomas Aquinas, but was a sort of empirical, mechanistic shell of nature. Whatever "nature" the naturalistic fallacy was based on was not the "nature" of the natural law of St. Thomas. I suppose if the great skeptic Hume nodded, we ought not be too surprised that the great believer de Lubac nodded. After all, though one was a skeptic and the other a believer, and both had quiet impressive brains, they were both made of flesh.
Henri de Lubac, S.J.
But the Enlightenment concept of nature, if accepted, affected more than the doctrine natural law. It also affected the relationship between human nature and divine grace. It robbed human nature of any integrity and independent meaning, and so robbed human nature of any end proximate or proportionate, and subordinate to, the finis ultimus, which was, in the Christian view, the supernatural end of the beatific vision revealed in the Gospel. And this inadequacy in the concept of nature robbed human nature of any significance in the nature/grace synthesis, which caused a great disequilibrium. Though he tried to keep upright, de Lubac lost his balance in the disequilibrium.
In seeing how de Lubac stumbled, it is important to focus on the Thomistic source texts. We cannot possibly quote them all, but we can quote enough of them to indicate the problem requiring reconciliation wherein de Lubac failed. First, St. Thomas clearly posits a natural end of man, a natural finis or telos in nature to know God, and suggests further that this natural desire for God cannot have been placed in us in vain. There are also other texts which clearly state, however, that man's end is supernatural, that the end of man is the beatific vision of God. It is these two kinds of texts that must be reconciled if we are to understand the Thomistic doctrinal synthesis.***
In his Summa contra gentiles, III, 25, St. Thomas states that rational substances, man of course being one of them, have the end of knowing God, and so there is a natural desire for God. The entire chapter in the Summa contra Gentiles is too lengthy to quote (the entire Chapter, in both Latin and English can be accessed here), but it is manifest that St. Thomas sees that there is an ultimate end in man's nature to know God. As an example, we take the conclusion of n. 10.
St. Thomas Aquinas's Summa theologiae, Ia-IIae, q. 3, a. 8 also states very clearly that there is a natural desire for God in human nature.
From this principle that man has a natural desire as a result of his nature to know God, the teaching of St. Thomas in his Summa theologiae, I., q. 75, a. 6 becomes important. In the context of discussing whether the human soul is incorruptible, St. Thomas enunciates the standard principle that natural desires are not in vain.
In his Compendium theologiae, Chapter 104, too lengthy to quote here entire, St. Thomas repeats the notion that no natural desire is in vain.
Given the natural desire of man to know God, and given that it cannot have been placed in us in vain, there has to be some purpose or significance in this natural desire, so that it is not merely subsumed into man's supernatural destiny and thereby becoming meaningless. What these texts say, then, is that man's nature has an end that is reflected in a natural desire to know God and that it is not something vain. Man's nature, therefore, has a role in guiding him and in giving meaning to his life, and that nature has, as it were, a finis, a telos, an end. It is not, however, the finis ultimus, the final end of man, since we have also to consider the "supernatural texts," wherein St. Thomas clearly insists that man's end is supernatural, and not limited to the natural.
The following texts, the "supernatural texts," seem clearly to posit differences between natural and proximate ends and supernatural ends.
In his Summa Theologiae, Ia q. 75 a. 7 ad 1 (addressing the question of whether the soul of man is of the same species as that of an angel, specifically the argument or objection that the human soul is of the same species as that of an angel since something's nature is defined by its end, and both angel and human soul have eternal happiness or beatitude as the same end, an end which is supernatural) touches on man's supernatural end. In concluding that an angel is a different species from man's soul, St. Thomas distinguishes between man's natural end and his supernatural end.
Clearly, St. Thomas has here given man both a natural end and a supernatural end. The teaching is repeated in his book addressing the human soul, Quaestiones de anima, a. 7, ad. 10
Similarly, St. Thomas in his Quaestiones disputate de veritate, q. 14, a. 10, ad. 2, makes it clear that man's destiny is supernatural, not natural.
It is manifest that St. Thomas has taught that man has both a natural end and a supernatural end. How, and in what manner, does man have both? The key to the reconcilement is to have a proper understanding of human "nature," for what we understand by human "nature" allows us better to understanding what is above that "nature," that is what supernatural and the product of sanctifying grace in union with that nature.
Two different kinds of texts have tangential importance to the question because they provide guidance. They are corollaries to any proper Thomistic synthesis. If our understanding of the relationship between nature and grace does not sit comfortably with the following, we have a sign that we have gone awry, or that at least we have not grasped St. Thomas's synthetic view. The first of these is the notion that--ex hypothesi--man could have been created in a state of pure nature lacking any supernatural aid of grace.** This we found distinctly state in St. Thomas's Quodlibetal Questions I, q. 4, a. 3, resp.
Finally, we must consider the teaching of St. Thomas in his De malo (On Evil), q. 5, a. I, ad 15. Specifically, we must accept the notion that since the supernatural life that God has provided us as a gift is entirely unmerited, it would not be considered an injustice if God would not have provided it, but would have allowed man to state within his natural state alone. (As an aside, that is why, irrespective of whether the limbo exists or does not, there is no question of an injustice on the part of God if he were to place unbaptized children there, since they would enjoy natural happiness and their natural end, something much more than they would enjoy on earth.)
De Lubac's treatment of the supernatural and of the nature/grace question according to Long completely focuses on one set of texts and "more or less passes by" those that are inconvenient, "save when generically suggesting that these other sources of Thomist reservations regarding his thesis are Renaissance corruptions concocted by [the great 15th/16th century Thomistic commentator] Cajetan." Long, 16. Long insists that this is a "conspicuous" "speculative omission" in the "historical insight of the scholars of la nouvelle théologie" which caused "theological difficulties" in the area of natural law and the relationship between nature and grace. Long, 228, n. 13. Long suggests, cryptically and without elaborating, that de Lubac may have been a victim of the neo-scholasticism of his early days:
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*Cajetan (Gaetanus)--not to be confused with St. Cajetan (1480-1547), the founder of the Theatines--is a reference to Thomas Cajetan, also known as Tomaso de Vio (1469-1534), an Italian cardinal and influential commentator of St. Thomas. He is best known for opposing the teachings of Martin Luther when he was the Pope's legate in Wittenberg.
**Compare de Lubac's statement in his The Mystery of the Supernatural where, in respect to the hypothesis that one may have a "humbler destiny," that is a natural one alone, "as something imprinted upon me, in my nature as it is," is, as "[m]ost people would agree . . . by hypothesis, impossible." (quoted in Long, 225, n. 7). But this is precisely what St. Thomas suggests is possible! This should have warned de Lubac that his understanding of St. Thomas was not quite right.
***The relationship between the natural end and the supernatural end was handled by the early neo-scholastic Cardinal Mercier. For his treatment of the issue, far different from de Lubac's treatment, see Cardinal Mercier and the Natural Law, Part 5: Contemplation of God as the Ultimate Good.
Like many institutions, many beliefs, and many philosophical concepts--like the Cathedral of Notredame where the cult of reason replaced the worship of the divine and a statute of liberty replaced the Virgin Mary--the notion of "human nature" has been a casualty of the Enlightenment. As a result of the prejudices and biases of Enlightenment thinkers, in particular their rejection of Aristotelian teleology and their "deific view of freedom," any theonomic principle in the concept of human nature was excised or amputated. This, of course, had huge effects on the understanding of natural law--which was predicated or built upon the concept of human nature. Tinker with the understanding of human nature and you tinker with natural law. That is why many of the "natural law" theories following the Enlightenment are not natural law theories at all, but cheap imitations or shadows of traditional natural law concepts. This denudation of the concept of human nature is what led Hume into believing that nature's "is" could never yield to nature's "ought." The nature he criticized as unable to yield values, was not the nature of St. Thomas Aquinas, but was a sort of empirical, mechanistic shell of nature. Whatever "nature" the naturalistic fallacy was based on was not the "nature" of the natural law of St. Thomas. I suppose if the great skeptic Hume nodded, we ought not be too surprised that the great believer de Lubac nodded. After all, though one was a skeptic and the other a believer, and both had quiet impressive brains, they were both made of flesh.
Henri de Lubac, S.J.
But the Enlightenment concept of nature, if accepted, affected more than the doctrine natural law. It also affected the relationship between human nature and divine grace. It robbed human nature of any integrity and independent meaning, and so robbed human nature of any end proximate or proportionate, and subordinate to, the finis ultimus, which was, in the Christian view, the supernatural end of the beatific vision revealed in the Gospel. And this inadequacy in the concept of nature robbed human nature of any significance in the nature/grace synthesis, which caused a great disequilibrium. Though he tried to keep upright, de Lubac lost his balance in the disequilibrium.
In seeing how de Lubac stumbled, it is important to focus on the Thomistic source texts. We cannot possibly quote them all, but we can quote enough of them to indicate the problem requiring reconciliation wherein de Lubac failed. First, St. Thomas clearly posits a natural end of man, a natural finis or telos in nature to know God, and suggests further that this natural desire for God cannot have been placed in us in vain. There are also other texts which clearly state, however, that man's end is supernatural, that the end of man is the beatific vision of God. It is these two kinds of texts that must be reconciled if we are to understand the Thomistic doctrinal synthesis.***
In his Summa contra gentiles, III, 25, St. Thomas states that rational substances, man of course being one of them, have the end of knowing God, and so there is a natural desire for God. The entire chapter in the Summa contra Gentiles is too lengthy to quote (the entire Chapter, in both Latin and English can be accessed here), but it is manifest that St. Thomas sees that there is an ultimate end in man's nature to know God. As an example, we take the conclusion of n. 10.
St. Thomas Aquinas's Summa theologiae, Ia-IIae, q. 3, a. 8 also states very clearly that there is a natural desire for God in human nature.
From this principle that man has a natural desire as a result of his nature to know God, the teaching of St. Thomas in his Summa theologiae, I., q. 75, a. 6 becomes important. In the context of discussing whether the human soul is incorruptible, St. Thomas enunciates the standard principle that natural desires are not in vain.
| LATIN | ENGLISH |
| Naturale autem desiderium non potest esse inane. | But a natural desire cannot be in vain. end. |
In his Compendium theologiae, Chapter 104, too lengthy to quote here entire, St. Thomas repeats the notion that no natural desire is in vain.
| LATIN | ENGLISH |
| Impossibile est autem naturale desiderium esse vanum.. | It is impossible therefore that a natural desire be in vain. |
Given the natural desire of man to know God, and given that it cannot have been placed in us in vain, there has to be some purpose or significance in this natural desire, so that it is not merely subsumed into man's supernatural destiny and thereby becoming meaningless. What these texts say, then, is that man's nature has an end that is reflected in a natural desire to know God and that it is not something vain. Man's nature, therefore, has a role in guiding him and in giving meaning to his life, and that nature has, as it were, a finis, a telos, an end. It is not, however, the finis ultimus, the final end of man, since we have also to consider the "supernatural texts," wherein St. Thomas clearly insists that man's end is supernatural, and not limited to the natural.
The following texts, the "supernatural texts," seem clearly to posit differences between natural and proximate ends and supernatural ends.
In his Summa Theologiae, Ia q. 75 a. 7 ad 1 (addressing the question of whether the soul of man is of the same species as that of an angel, specifically the argument or objection that the human soul is of the same species as that of an angel since something's nature is defined by its end, and both angel and human soul have eternal happiness or beatitude as the same end, an end which is supernatural) touches on man's supernatural end. In concluding that an angel is a different species from man's soul, St. Thomas distinguishes between man's natural end and his supernatural end.
Clearly, St. Thomas has here given man both a natural end and a supernatural end. The teaching is repeated in his book addressing the human soul, Quaestiones de anima, a. 7, ad. 10
| LATIN | ENGLISH |
| Quo ea quorum unus est finis proximus et naturalis, sunt unum secundum speciem. Beatitudo autem aeterna est finis ultimus et supernaturalis. | Things having one and the same proximate and natural end are one and the same specifically. However, eternal beatitude is an ultimate and supernatural end. |
Similarly, St. Thomas in his Quaestiones disputate de veritate, q. 14, a. 10, ad. 2, makes it clear that man's destiny is supernatural, not natural.
It is manifest that St. Thomas has taught that man has both a natural end and a supernatural end. How, and in what manner, does man have both? The key to the reconcilement is to have a proper understanding of human "nature," for what we understand by human "nature" allows us better to understanding what is above that "nature," that is what supernatural and the product of sanctifying grace in union with that nature.
Two different kinds of texts have tangential importance to the question because they provide guidance. They are corollaries to any proper Thomistic synthesis. If our understanding of the relationship between nature and grace does not sit comfortably with the following, we have a sign that we have gone awry, or that at least we have not grasped St. Thomas's synthetic view. The first of these is the notion that--ex hypothesi--man could have been created in a state of pure nature lacking any supernatural aid of grace.** This we found distinctly state in St. Thomas's Quodlibetal Questions I, q. 4, a. 3, resp.
Finally, we must consider the teaching of St. Thomas in his De malo (On Evil), q. 5, a. I, ad 15. Specifically, we must accept the notion that since the supernatural life that God has provided us as a gift is entirely unmerited, it would not be considered an injustice if God would not have provided it, but would have allowed man to state within his natural state alone. (As an aside, that is why, irrespective of whether the limbo exists or does not, there is no question of an injustice on the part of God if he were to place unbaptized children there, since they would enjoy natural happiness and their natural end, something much more than they would enjoy on earth.)
De Lubac's treatment of the supernatural and of the nature/grace question according to Long completely focuses on one set of texts and "more or less passes by" those that are inconvenient, "save when generically suggesting that these other sources of Thomist reservations regarding his thesis are Renaissance corruptions concocted by [the great 15th/16th century Thomistic commentator] Cajetan." Long, 16. Long insists that this is a "conspicuous" "speculative omission" in the "historical insight of the scholars of la nouvelle théologie" which caused "theological difficulties" in the area of natural law and the relationship between nature and grace. Long, 228, n. 13. Long suggests, cryptically and without elaborating, that de Lubac may have been a victim of the neo-scholasticism of his early days:
That the pedagogic and heuristic limits of the scholastic project to which he was exposed may accidentally have contributed to kindling such mistrust in a mind as cultured and learned as de Lubac's constitutes a tragedy within the twentieth-century history of Thomism. Yet, the omission to which this mistrust led, is with the distance of time, difficult to deny.Long, 16.
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*Cajetan (Gaetanus)--not to be confused with St. Cajetan (1480-1547), the founder of the Theatines--is a reference to Thomas Cajetan, also known as Tomaso de Vio (1469-1534), an Italian cardinal and influential commentator of St. Thomas. He is best known for opposing the teachings of Martin Luther when he was the Pope's legate in Wittenberg.
**Compare de Lubac's statement in his The Mystery of the Supernatural where, in respect to the hypothesis that one may have a "humbler destiny," that is a natural one alone, "as something imprinted upon me, in my nature as it is," is, as "[m]ost people would agree . . . by hypothesis, impossible." (quoted in Long, 225, n. 7). But this is precisely what St. Thomas suggests is possible! This should have warned de Lubac that his understanding of St. Thomas was not quite right.
***The relationship between the natural end and the supernatural end was handled by the early neo-scholastic Cardinal Mercier. For his treatment of the issue, far different from de Lubac's treatment, see Cardinal Mercier and the Natural Law, Part 5: Contemplation of God as the Ultimate Good.
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